The problem of personal identity among others may stem from the following question—what does be the person that you are, from one day to the next, necessarily consist of? The diachronic problem of personal identity raises question on the necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of the person over time. The synchronic problem is grounded in the question of what features or traits characterize a given person at one time. To answer these questions, John Locke discarded the soul and the body as necessary and sufficient substances for personal identity over time. He accepted consciousness as the only criterion for personal identity; the only thing capable of remaining the same and preserving personal identity through change. Though Locke’s argument is somewhat clear and coherent but what remains vague and incoherent is embedded in the question—what exactly is consciousness? How and why should it be the basis or criterion for the determination of personal identity? Using the method of critical analysis, I argue that Locke’s choice of consciousness as the determinant of personal identity, though quite novel, is incoherent and vague. Secondly, Locke had already presumed and anticipated clearly though fallaciously the very thing he wishes to substantiate. I therefore conclude that Locke’s argument is just another way of trying to escape but inadvertently prolonging the difficulty of apparently articulating a distinction between the psychological approach and physiological approach to the problem of personal identity. However, in my submission, I propose the concept of the “other” as alternative approach— a sort of an extrinsic-intrinsic approach to the problem of personal identity.

Knowledge in Sadra’ philosophy, is merely presence of something near Percipient. The most perfect sense of “ presence” under this school, is intuitive knowledge of human being about “ self” within which knowing and known have unity. Hence, From Sadra’ s view, “ knowledge” of “ self” has a very high rank position in philosophy. However, what is described as " intuitive knowledge to self" in transcendental wisdom, From Kant’ s view is not intuitive knowledge; but this knowledge is also a kind of our empirical knowledge where is obtained through mediation of “ subjective form” which is called “ appearance” by Kant. But Kant believes that other than this “ empirical ego” assigned to “ transcendental ego” He believes that it cannot, as Nomenon, be placed in the center of the human experiential vision. Therefor, he neither believes knowledge of self as an acquired knowledge nor as intuitive one. In this article, we explains this problem of why Mulla Sadra considers intuitive cognition of self. This problem is embedded within a more general problem: Whether that ego which comprehends itself belongs to knowledge? In this paper, we will show that the “ knowledge” of “ self” , unlike Kant's conception, cannot be explained except by the existential attitude, because intuitive perception is a kind of presence in existence and for existence.

Background: From Dostoyevsky's point of view, the touch of death causes fear and anxiety in a person, which forces a person to feel his body and meet his needs. The present study is especially focused on the crime and punishment novel by this author. The purpose of this research is to represent the approach of death awareness and finding the meaning of life in relation to death in order to recognize the moral concepts in Dostoevsky's death thoughts in the book Crime and Punishment. Conclusion: Dostoevsky, as a believer, is searching for the true meaning of life. He considers the two principles of faith in God and morality to give meaning to life and the world. The results of the present study showed that the effect of the death of consciousness and its reflection on how a person lives according to Dostoyevsky can create the will to happiness in a person, which creates moral issues such as moral responsibility, moral awareness in the approval of the other, and self-sacrifice for the other. In this way, it affects the process of human life and changes the way of living

Husserl, corresponding to three levels of temporality, introduces three levels of time-consciousness in his works. These three levels of time-consciousness are the consciousness of the temporality of transcendent objects (objective time), the consciousness of the temporality of intentional acts and experiences (subjective time), and finally, the deepest level is what he calls consciousness of inner time or absolute consciousness. This third level is the continuous stream or flow of consciousness which in its streaming constitutes itself and other levels of temporality. Although this constituting flow is the deepest foundation of temporality, it is not temporal in the ordinary meaning of the term. That means despite being self-constituting and self-temporalizing it is not given in a higher level of time. Understanding the true meaning of this level of temporality, for long, has been a challenge for scholars. One of the attempts to interpret and demystify this layer of temporality is based on making a connection between this absolute flow of consciousness and a kind of implicit and minimal self-consciousness usually called pre-reflective self-consciousness. In this article besides explaining the three levels of temporality and time-consciousness, I have analyzed this view about the relationship between the third level of time-consciousness and pre-reflective self-consciousness and compared the ideas of scholars on the matter.

Moore’ s sentences are sentences of the form “ p but I don't believe that p” or “ p but I believe that not-p” . These sentences might be true, yet they are ‘ absurd’ to believe or assert. According to some version of Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness such as Higher-Order Thought Theory (HOT), it is claimed that conscious beliefs in Moorean sentences is not possible. Namely, one will become irrational with their conscious beliefs in their set of beliefs. In this paper we will first introduce Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness and will show that How they work. we will then argue that there are at least four criticisms against approaches based on Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness in relation of Moore's Paradox and thus are not tenable. Key words: Moore's paradox, epistemic paradox, rationality, Consciousness, Higher-Order Thought Theory

The phenomenology of ordinary perceptual experiences reveals a close tie between attention and visual consciousness. Mainly speaking, if we attend to something, we are conscious of it, and if we are conscious of something, we can direct our attention towards its particulars. But what exactly is the nature of the relationship? Is attention a necessary or sufficient condition for consciousness? Ordinary experiences alone cannot answer the question. To reach a compelling answer, philosophical reflections and empirical evidence should be merged. Adopting this approach, the paper claims that attention is not a necessary or sufficient condition for visual consciousness. To prove the claim, we just need to demonstrate that there is a case of awareness without attention and a case of attention without awareness.  For awareness without attention, identity crowding, and certain cases of ordinary experiences, and for attention without attention, some instances of blindsight and Jiang’s experiment are referred to. Furthermore, as a supplementary move, opposing viewpoints are introduced. In order to defend the main claim, the views are criticized.